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Working capital managementSince 1988, cash holding of the UK companies has increased from 10.6% to 16.4% of total assets. To explain this
increase, we develop a panel vector autoregression and analyse the dynamics between cash holding and its clos-
est substitutes, trade credit and short-term bank ﬁnance. Impulse response functions conﬁrm the signalling the-
ory, as trade credit facilitates access to bank ﬁnance. Firms experiencing liquidity shocks resort to cash or trade
credit but not to bank ﬁnance. Cash holding improves access to trade credit. Additional cash and trade credit trig-
ger a slowdown of the cash conversion cycle explainedby agency theory. Cash-rich ﬁrmshave accumulatedmore
cash than predicted because of anunexpected decline in short-term debt, stressing the role of banks in explaining
the increase in cash holding.
© 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) show that average cash ratios, deﬁned
as cash and cash equivalents relative to total assets, of the US ﬁrms
increased from 10.5% to 23.2% in the period from 1980 to 2006. We
analyse the UK listed companies in the period from 1988 to 2008 and
ﬁnd an increase in average cash ratios from 10.6% to 16.4%. In contrast,
Ferreira and Vilela (2004: 303) state that “it is not possible to identify
any clear trend” in cash holding in EMU countries between 1987 and
2000. Yet their investigation period does not include the Dot-com
bubble or the recent ﬁnancial crisis. The literature on cash holding
focuses on four motives determining the demand for cash: transaction,
precaution, investment opportunities, and self-interest (Graham &
Harvey, 2001; Harford, 1999; Harford, Mansi, & Maxwell, 2008;
Keynes, 1936; Myers, 1977; Myers & Majluf, 1984). The motive driven
view understates the importance of a supply-side explanation. Cash
holding might increase due to a lack of alternative funding. The main
characteristic of cash is its ﬂexibility, as it is available instantaneously
(Ang & Smedema, 2011). The closest substitutes in terms of instanta-
neous access are trade credit and short-term bank ﬁnance. Of course,
reducing dividends or selling assets can provide liquidity — but theseghts reserved.options are not instantaneous and costly due to signalling effects and
transaction costs (Keynes, 1936; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson,
1999).
This paper considers the demand and supply-side explanations of
cash holding by analysing the dynamics between cash holding and its
closest substitutes, trade credit and short-term bank ﬁnance. To capture
a ﬁrm's short-term liquidity need, we determine the cash conversion
cycle (CCC). We develop a panel vector autoregression (VAR) account-
ing for the complex interrelationships between cash holding, trade
credit, short-term bank ﬁnance and liquidity needs. This novel method
leads to three contributions: (1) distinguishing between the demand
and supply-side of liquidity, (2) extending the dynamic model of cash
holding, and (3) analysing the mismatch of expectations concerning
access to short-term bank ﬁnance.
The literature on cash holding mainly relies on demand-side
explanations (Opler et al., 1999); however, Bates et al. (2009) contend
that there was no shift in the demand for cash that could explain the
recent increase in cash holding. They argue that ﬁrm characteristics
changed, increasing cash holding due to riskier cash ﬂows, higher R&D
intensity and lower working capital requirements (i.e. lower inventory
and accounts receivable). Bates et al. (2009) do not consider the role of
trade credit granted by suppliers and short-term bank ﬁnance. Both
sources of short-term funding have declined sharply in the UK during
the investigation period. Hence, the supply-side is essential in under-
standing the recent increase in cash holding. After specifying a panel
124 G. Kling et al. / International Review of Financial Analysis 32 (2014) 123–131VAR, we determine impulse response functions to differentiate between
demand and supply-side effects. This provides insights into the dynamic
relationships between cash holding, ﬁrms' liquidity needs, trade credit
and short-term bank ﬁnance.
This paper extends the dynamic model of cash holding by incorpo-
rating additional lags based on information criteria (Opler et al., 1999;
Ozkan, Ozkan, & N., 2004). Static models are biased because past cash
holding affects current cash holding. Apart from improving the econo-
metric validity of themodel, we gain insights into the dynamic relation-
ship between the demand and supply of liquidity. In particular, we
specify a panel vector autoregression (VAR) with four dependent
variables: cash holding, the CCC to capture a ﬁrm's liquidity need,
trade credit and short-term bank ﬁnance. The literature on trade credit
applies panel VARs to aggregated data (Nilsen, 2002). In contrast, our
panel VAR refers to the ﬁrm-level and deals with the inherent
endogeneity andﬁrmheterogeneity by applying a systemGMMestima-
tion (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Ozkan et al., 2004). Granger causality tests
show that the four variables are endogenous. Consequently, a single-
equation approach suffers from an endogeneity bias (Opler et al.,
1999; Ozkan et al., 2004). In particular, the liquidity need measured
by the CCC is endogenous; hence, using the CCC as an explanatory
variable without a time lag violates weak exogeneity (Deloof, 2001).
In spite of delivering accurate one-step ahead forecasts for the
average ﬁrm, the model understates the rapid accumulation of cash by
cash-rich ﬁrms deﬁned as belonging to the 75-percentile in 1988.
Hence, we impose a liquidity constraint, which states that cash holding
has to be sufﬁcient to cover networking capital given expected access to
external ﬁnance. We show that cash-rich ﬁrms suffer from lower than
expected access to external ﬁnance. Accordingly, the pronounced in-
crease in cash holding can be explained by a mismatch of expectations,
a novel ﬁnding.
This paper has the following structure: section two reviews the liter-
ature on the relationship between cash holding, trade credit, access to
short-term bank ﬁnance and the CCC; section three discusses the
dataset and construction of variables; section four introduces theTable 1
Descriptive statistics.
Cash holding (cash) is deﬁned as cash and cash equivalents relative to total assets. Short-term
refers to the ratio of accounts payable and total assets. Liquidity (liquid) is measured by the c
The return on assets (ROA) is deﬁned as earnings before interest and taxes divided by adjusted
interest expenses and debt. Firm size (size) refers to the natural logarithm of total assets. The
year window. Bank ﬁnance relative to total debt determines the variable bank. The interest cov
Financial leverage (L) refers to total debt relative to total assets. Panel C summarises the comp
accounts receivable relative to revenues (ar_rev) and accounts payable relative to cost of goods s
capital turnover (T). The table shows thenumber of observations (Obs), themean, standarddevi
mean from 1988 to 2008.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. M
Panel A: endogenous variables
cash 14,073 0.158 0.154
S 13,801 0.228 0.124
tc 13,803 0.118 0.082
liquid 13,105 0.212 0.146
Panel B: control variables
growth 12,511 0.160 0.269 −
ROA 13,977 −0.013 0.263 −
i 12,116 0.101 0.065
size 14,631 10.721 1.966
risk 14,515 0.930 0.931
bank 6518 0.255 0.324
cover 12,776 7.086 22.219 −
L 14,622 0.156 0.143
Panel C: components of the cash conversion cycle
inv_cogs 14,444 0.090 0.088
ar_rev 13,730 0.210 0.116
ap_cogs 13,714 0.107 0.055
Panel D: components of proﬁtability (ROA)
k 13,704 1.024 0.272
T 13,490 2.063 1.474panel VAR and shows our ﬁndings followed by robustness checks and
concluding remarks.
2. Literature review
2.1. The motive-driven view of cash holding
Empirical studies use net working capital, which includes trade
credit, as an explanatory variable (e.g. Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; Opler
et al., 1999). Yet, the literature does not consider the role of trade credit
as a source of external funding explicitly. In contrast, the literature on
the relationship between trade credit and access to bank ﬁnance
discussed in the next section largely ignores the role of cash holding.
Consequently, it seems to be essential to combine both strands of the lit-
erature and analyse the demand and supply-side of liquidity. The
literature on cash holding identiﬁes the following theories: transaction
cost theory, information asymmetry between debt and equity holders,
and agency costs due to a conﬂict of interest between shareholders
and managers.
Transaction cost theory argues that transaction costs due to
converting cash substitutes into cash justify cash holding (Keynes,
1936; Miller & Orr, 1966; Tobin, 1956). There are several hypotheses
related to the transaction cost theory highlighted by Opler et al.
(1999). Some of these hypotheses refer to long-term decision making
not relevant formeeting short-term liquidity needs due to the lack of in-
stantaneous access. For instance, the asset sales of diversiﬁed companies
and the reduction of dividend payments cannot substitute cash holding
in the short-term (Ang & Smedema, 2011). Information asymmetry be-
tween debt and equity holders could explain cash holding. Myers and
Majluf (1984) contend that securities might be undervalued by
outsiders due to the lack of access to information. R&D expenses
serve as a proxy for projects with a high degree of information
asymmetry. As we focus on the instantaneous availability of cash and
its closest substitutes, R&D expenses and some forms of external ﬁnance
(e.g. equity issues) are not a relevant option to meet short-termbank ﬁnance (S) is the ratio of short-term bank ﬁnance and total assets. Trade credit (tc)
ash conversion cycle CCC (see Eq. (1)). Growth refers to the annual growth rate in sales.
total assets (total assets excluding cash). Pre-tax cost of debt (i) is determined based on
measure for cash ﬂow volatility (risk) is the variation coefﬁcient of cash ﬂows in a three-
erage (cover) is deﬁned as earning before interest and taxes relative to interest expenses.
onents of the CCC (see Eq. (1)), namely inventory relative to cost of goods sold (inv_cogs),
old (ap_cogs). Panel D shows the components of proﬁtability, the cost–income ratio (k) and
ation (Std. Dev.),minimum,maximumand the change inpercent based on themedian and
in Max Median change Average change
0.006 0.481 71.0% 54.7%
0.062 0.453 −23.6% −18.4%
0.019 0.271 −48.7% −34.8%
0.017 0.497 −25.3% −15.6%
0.184 0.732 −15.3% −13.4%
0.643 0.243 −66.7% −133.1%
0.032 0.251 −28.0% −20.3%
7.877 14.028 −0.8% −1.6%
0.136 3.077 139.2% 106.5%
0.001 0.880 −72.2% −13.1%
32.000 53.329 −68.6% −73.5%
0.000 0.417 0.0% 10.6%
0.000 0.249 −85.1% −55.3%
0.057 0.450 1.5% 10.6%
0.034 0.208 −28.7% −19.5%
0.780 1.715 7.9% 21.3%
0.192 4.785 −53.4% −40.3%
Fig. 1. Endogenous time series based on sample averages. The ﬁgure shows the average value of cash holding (cash), short-term bank ﬁnance (S), liquidity need (liquid) and trade credit
(tc) of the whole sample. All variables are in percent of total assets.
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managers and shareholders are of a long-term nature such as empire
building through acquisitions (Jensen, 1986). However, there might be a
short-term equivalent, namely the incentive to improve working capital
management, which this paper discusses.
The empirical evidence for transaction costs and information
asymmetry and the related motives of transaction, precaution,
and investment opportunities stress the predominant role of trans-
actions in explaining cash holding (Beltz & Frank, 1996; Deloof,
2001; John, 1993). D'Mello, Krishnaswami, and Larkin (2008)
show that ﬁrms with easy internal ﬁnancing hold little cash,
whereas ﬁrms with high growth opportunities and volatile cash
ﬂows hold more cash. Based on the theoretical considerations,
costs of holding cash (opportunity costs), cost of external ﬁnance,
volatility of cash ﬂows, ﬁrm size and growth opportunities deter-
mine cash holding. Holding cash is mainly driven by the need to
execute transactions — but prevention could be relevant in the
case of small ﬁrms in unstable environments. Opler et al. (1999)
analyse the determinants of cash holding in the US and uncover
that cash holding is negatively associated with ﬁrm size and posi-
tively associated with investment opportunities, risk and the difﬁ-
culty in obtaining external ﬁnance measured by high ﬁnancial
leverage.
2.2. Access to short-term bank ﬁnance and trade credit
The literature on trade credit and short-term bank ﬁnance falls into
two main categories: (1) the substitution hypothesis pioneered by
Meltzer (1960) and (2) the complementary view based on signalling
theory and the underlying information asymmetry between suppliers
and banks (Bias & Gollier, 1997; Jain, 2001). Firms with access to bank
ﬁnance need less trade credit, which is usually more expensive; thus,
there is a substitution effect (Bias & Gollier, 1997). Yet, the literature
contends that substitution is the direct effect, whereas trade credit has
an indirect signalling effect. We test the relationship between trade
credit and short-term bank ﬁnance, which could conﬁrm the substitu-
tion effect or the signalling theory. In addition, Petersen and Rajan
(1997) emphasise that there is a positive correlation between the ﬁrm's
willingness to provide trade credit and access to short-term ﬁnance.
Amid the ﬁnancial crisis, this effect could be of importance, as ﬁrms
might face pressure from two sides: restricted access to bank ﬁnance
due to the credit crunch and less trade credit granted by suppliers,
which in turn suffer from a lack of short-term liquidity.2.3. The need for liquidity based on the cash conversion cycle (CCC)
The cash holding literature has tested the transaction motive using
sales as a proxy, which should reﬂect the ﬁrm's business activities and
associated transaction needs. Using sales as a proxy is problematic,
since sales and ﬁrm size are correlated. Hence, it is difﬁcult to distin-
guish between size effects and transaction needs. For instance, ﬁrms
with low accounts receivable and high sales do not need much cash,
as customers tend to pay immediately (e.g. retailers have high sales
and low accounts receivable, which results in negative networking cap-
ital). Accordingly, to determine the liquidity needs of a ﬁrm, we follow
Deloof (2001) and calculate the CCC of each ﬁrm. The CCC, which goes
back to Gitman (1974), is a dynamic measure of liquidity and better
than static measures such as net working capital relative to total assets.
Most studies of the CCC focus on its impact on proﬁtability measures
conﬁrming a negative relationship (Wang, 2002). So a smaller CCC
improves proﬁtability, which in turn enhances shareholder value.
3. The method of sampling and construction of variables
We collected annual data from Datastream on all companies listed
on the London Stock Exchange (Main Market) in the period from 1988
to 2008. To cross-check accounting data, we used annual reports. After
removing regulated industries such as utilities andﬁnancial institutions,
the sample consists of 1343 companies. Due to missing values, the
maximum number of ﬁrm-year observations is 14631. As the number
of listed companies changed during the investigation period, the
robustness check considers a potential survivorship bias. The four
endogenous variables refer to cash ratios deﬁned as cash and cash
equivalents relative to total assets (cash), trade credit granted by
suppliers deﬁned as accounts payable relative to total assets (tc),
short-term bank ﬁnance relative to total assets (S), and the ﬁrm's
liquidity need based on the CCC (liquid). Eq. (1) deﬁnes the CCC,
which follows Deloof (2001).
liquidit ¼
INVit
COGSit
þ ARit
REVit
− APit
COGSit
: ð1Þ
In line with prior research, we included sales growth (growth), ﬁrm
size deﬁned as the natural logarithmof total assets (size), and proﬁtabil-
ity measured by the return on adjusted total assets (ROA). To remove
the effect of non-operating assets including excess cash, we adjust
total assets to reﬂect only net property, plant and equipment and net
Table 2
Annual averages.
The table provides annual averages for selected variables.
Year growth ROA i size risk bank cover L inv_cogs ar_rev ap_cogs k T
1988 – 0.154 0.118 10.950 0.418 0.321 17.334 0.142 0.161 0.198 0.128 0.880 2.803
1989 0.231 0.138 0.124 11.028 0.505 0.246 13.688 0.168 0.152 0.205 0.125 0.894 2.633
1990 0.129 0.126 0.145 11.149 0.614 0.273 9.796 0.177 0.144 0.191 0.119 0.910 2.565
1991 0.040 0.092 0.142 11.136 0.624 0.313 8.518 0.182 0.136 0.187 0.110 0.935 2.479
1992 0.047 0.081 0.131 11.134 0.670 0.268 9.005 0.185 0.135 0.190 0.109 0.939 2.407
1993 0.101 0.083 0.121 11.206 0.662 0.265 9.881 0.165 0.126 0.187 0.113 0.938 2.425
1994 0.125 0.093 0.104 11.261 0.672 0.239 12.035 0.154 0.126 0.195 0.118 0.940 2.407
1995 0.177 0.096 0.103 11.324 0.620 0.222 12.135 0.158 0.124 0.194 0.117 0.937 2.500
1996 0.155 0.090 0.109 10.915 0.696 0.213 11.550 0.154 0.112 0.194 0.114 0.958 2.550
1997 0.134 0.083 0.108 10.844 0.768 0.236 12.070 0.152 0.108 0.197 0.115 0.973 2.582
1998 0.130 0.039 0.100 10.887 0.823 0.236 11.129 0.167 0.102 0.202 0.111 0.986 2.438
1999 0.136 0.023 0.101 10.869 0.850 0.234 9.035 0.169 0.098 0.207 0.110 0.996 2.177
2000 0.184 −0.029 0.100 10.842 0.953 0.239 6.894 0.155 0.089 0.222 0.110 1.044 1.948
2001 0.179 −0.072 0.100 10.752 0.917 0.254 2.505 0.157 0.082 0.212 0.102 1.082 1.917
2002 0.111 −0.098 0.091 10.532 0.867 0.246 1.224 0.164 0.077 0.211 0.096 1.100 1.938
2003 0.131 −0.089 0.088 10.383 0.850 0.252 3.085 0.165 0.071 0.209 0.097 1.087 2.025
2004 0.163 −0.055 0.091 10.348 0.854 0.260 6.462 0.152 0.071 0.209 0.103 1.048 2.042
2005 0.189 −0.057 0.093 10.395 0.816 0.265 6.145 0.142 0.069 0.221 0.105 1.054 1.907
2006 0.207 −0.051 0.092 10.490 0.868 0.268 5.172 0.142 0.069 0.224 0.106 1.060 1.803
2007 0.197 −0.053 0.095 10.632 0.864 0.269 5.286 0.147 0.068 0.227 0.104 1.067 1.700
2008 0.200 −0.051 0.094 10.774 0.863 0.279 4.591 0.157 0.072 0.219 0.103 1.067 1.672
Total 0.160 −0.013 0.101 10.721 0.805 0.255 7.086 0.156 0.090 0.210 0.107 1.024 2.063
1 We cannot include ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects, for dummy variables would be correlat-
edwith the lagged endogenous time series. Ozkan et al. (2004) address the related estima-
tion issues and apply Arellano and Bond's (1991) GMM estimator.
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of external debtﬁnance, and it is also used as a proxy for the opportunity
cost of cash holding, as cash substitutes external debt ﬁnance (Opler
et al., 1999). The following proxies incorporate ﬁrms' ﬁnancial risk:
ﬁnancial leverage deﬁned as total debt relative to total assets (L) and
interest coverage deﬁned as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT)
relative to interest expenses (cover). Some studies include the ratio of
bank ﬁnance to total debt (bank) to evaluate the monitoring role of
banks, which is also common in the trade credit literature (Gama,
Mateus, & Teixeira, 2008). We include a measure for the uncertainty
of cash ﬂows deﬁned as the variation coefﬁcient of EBIT in a three-
year window (risk). The deﬁnition of cash ﬂow risk differs from Bates
et al. (2009), for they refer to the mean of the standard deviation of
cash ﬂows in an industry based on 2-digit SIC codes. Their measure
captures the industry-speciﬁc cash ﬂow uncertainty but does not reﬂect
idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, variation coefﬁcients are robust if means
differ across ﬁrms. In addition, we determine the variables needed to
calculate the CCC, namely inventory relative to cost of goods sold
(inv_cogs), accounts receivable relative to revenues (ar_rev) and
accounts payable relative to cost of goods sold (ap_cogs). To illustrate
the underlying drivers of ﬁrms' proﬁtability, the descriptive statistics
also report the cost–income ratio deﬁned as operating costs relative to
operating income (k) and capital turnover deﬁned as sales relative to
total operating assets (T).
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Descriptive ﬁndings
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the whole investigation
period, and Fig. 1 depicts the time series of cash holding, the CCC,
trade credit and short-term bank ﬁnance, revealing an increase in cash
ratios from 10.6% to 16.4%. Apparently, cash holding increased long
before the current ﬁnancial crisis, reaching its peak in 2005. The need
for liquidity determined by the CCC (liquid) exhibited an initial decline
until 1993 but remained stable thereafter. Fig. 1 suggests that ﬁrms
faced a constant liquidity need, whereas short-term bank ﬁnance (S)
and trade credit (tc) exhibited a pronounced decline.
The question arises why the CCC has remained on a stable albeit high
level in spite of various improvements in working capital management.
Table 2 shows that inventory management improved substantially
(inv_cogs)—maybe due to better production and transport technologies.Accounts receivable relative to revenues (ar_rev) remained unchanged
indicating that the UKﬁrms had to provide trade credit to their customers
to maintain sales and remain competitive. This ﬁnding supports Nadiri's
(1969) model and shows that trade credit is part of the selling process.
Trade credit provided by suppliers relative to cost of goods sold (ap_cogs)
dropped; thus, the UK ﬁrms provided trade credit to their customers to
sustain sales— but found it harder to get trade credit from their suppliers.
Diminished capital turnover (T) and higher cost–income ratios (k)
reduce proﬁtability (ROA). Firm size (size) remained on a similar level,
whereas sales growth ﬂuctuated due to business cycles. The importance
of bank loans (bank) declined in line with control variables that affect
access to external ﬁnance. Interest coverage (cover) worsened indicat-
ing a lack of earnings to cover interest expenses. The latter indicates
that theUK companiesmightﬁnd it harder to get access to bankﬁnance.
The variation coefﬁcient of cash ﬂows (risk) increased over time. Cost of
debt (i) ﬂuctuated considerably in the investigation period — but
compared to the 1980s cost of debt declined. In contrast to their US
counterparts, the UK ﬁrms did not exhibit negative net debt in spite of
more cash holding, as ﬁnancial leverage (L) remained stable (Bates
et al., 2009).4.2. Panel vector autocorrelation (VAR)
To capture the dynamic relationships between cash holding, the
CCC, trade credit and short-term bank ﬁnance, we specify a panel VAR
with three lags based on the Bayesian Schwarz information criterion.
We estimate the panel VAR with panel OLS, which ignores ﬁrm-
speciﬁc effects, and systemGMMbased on the dynamic panel estimator
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) that considers ﬁrm-speciﬁc ef-
fects.1 The model includes a set of lagged exogenous control variables.
By lagging the control variables by one year, we ensure weak
exogeneity, as the variables are predetermined. We include sales
growth (growth), proﬁtability (ROA), and ﬁrm size (size). To evaluate
theﬁrm'sﬁnancial viability, themodel considers cost of debt (i), interest
coverage (cover), ﬁnancial leverage (L), and uncertainty of cash ﬂows
(risk). The relative importance of bank ﬁnance (bank) serves as a mea-
sure for the ﬁrm's relationship with banks. The column vector zit
Table 3
The panel VAR based on GMM and POLS.
Based on Eq. (2), panel VARs are estimated using short-term bank ﬁnance (S), cash holding (cash), liquidity needs (liquid) and trade credit (tc) as endogenous variables. The model also
includes a set of exogenous variables, revenue growth (growth), interest coverage (cover), ﬁnancial leverage (L), bank ﬁnance (bank), ﬁrm size (size), return on assets (ROA), volatility of
cash ﬂows (risk) and the pre-tax cost of debt (i). Stars (*, **, ***) indicates signiﬁcance on the 90%, 95%, and 99% level of conﬁdence respectively. The model is estimated using GMM and
OLS. For the OLS estimates, adjusted R-squared is reported. For the GMM estimates, the Wald Chi-squared test is shown as well as tests for the ﬁrst and second-order autocorrelation
(Corr1, Corr2). The table also provides the p-values of the Sargan and Hansen tests.
GMM estimation Panel VAR using panel OLS
S cash liquid tc S cash liquid tc
St − 1 0.408*** 0.005 −0.062*** 0.016* 0.647*** 0.033** −0.022 0.016**
St − 2 −0.006 −0.015 −0.006 −0.007 0.080*** 0.016 0.001 −0.018**
St − 3 −0.004 −0.020 −0.004 −0.003 0.109*** −0.011 −0.020 0.001
cash t − 1 0.001 0.412*** 0.109*** 0.060*** 0.006 0.610*** 0.035** 0.003
cash t − 2 0.000 0.021 0.006 0.028*** 0.013 0.106*** −0.020 0.016**
cash t − 3 −0.004 −0.023 −0.015 −0.011 0.026** 0.070*** 0.005 −0.019***
liquid t − 1 −0.053** 0.109*** 0.219*** 0.069*** −0.024 −0.002 0.571*** −0.007
liquid t − 2 −0.036* 0.016 −0.023 0.034*** −0.017 0.004 0.212*** 0.005
liquid t − 3 0.023 0.010 −0.050*** 0.007 0.020 0.004 0.116*** −0.004
tc t − 1 0.123*** 0.250*** 0.175*** 0.502*** 0.123*** −0.059* −0.016 0.732***
tc t − 2 −0.052 0.022 0.090** 0.080*** −0.121*** −0.037 0.056 0.146***
tc 0.010 −0.005 −0.011 −0.002 0.015 0.074** −0.031 0.047***
growth t − 1 −0.005 0.010 −0.004 −0.008*** −0.011** −0.005 −0.029*** −0.008***
cover t − 1 −0.000** −0.000*** 0.000 −0.000*** −0.000*** 0.000 0.000 −0.000***
L t − 1 −0.188*** 0.104*** 0.021 −0.011 −0.043*** −0.006 0.013 −0.022***
bank t − 1 0.006 −0.003 −0.008* −0.001 −0.007** 0.000 −0.002 0.001
size t − 1 0.014*** −0.016*** −0.018*** 0.002 0.000 −0.001* −0.002*** 0.000
ROA t − 1 0.012 0.035** 0.032** 0.021*** 0.009 −0.032*** 0.044*** 0.001
risk t − 1 −0.001 −0.005** 0.003 −0.001 0.003** 0.000 0.000 0.000
i t − 1 −0.015 0.109*** 0.071** 0.005 −0.013 0.093*** 0.071*** −0.002
Constant 0.028 0.166*** 0.349*** 0.001 0.049*** 0.024** 0.037*** 0.014***
Adjusted R2 – – – – 0.637 0.584 0.759 0.844
Wald Ch2 165.12*** 220.7*** 150.16*** 230.86*** – – – –
Corr1 −10.38*** −9.14*** −6.10*** −8.12*** – – – –
Corr2 −0.28 −1.69 −0.78 −1.11 – – – –
Sargan (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 – – – –
Hansen (p-value) 0.239 0.846 0.592 0.314 – – – –
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to the four dependent variables. Therefore, the panel VAR with four
equations takes the following form.
Sit
cashit
liquidit
tcit
0
BB@
1
CCA ¼ yit ¼ α þ
Xp
j¼1
Γyit− j þΞzit−1 þ θi þ εit: ð2Þ
Ourmodel extends Ozkan et al. (2004) dynamic panel datamodel by
including additional lags as suggested by the Bayesian information cri-
terion and by adding three dependent variables. All eigenvalues lie in-
side the unit circle, which fulﬁls the stability condition of the VAR. We
test the four dependent variables for unit-roots using the Fisher-type
panel test based on an augmented Dickey–Fuller test. This test also con-
siders deterministic trends and cross-sectional differences (ﬁrm-
speciﬁc effects). The test statistic has a p-value of 0.000 and indicates
that the four dependent variables are not unit-roots, which ensures
that the panel VAR in levels is appropriate.2
Table 3 reports the coefﬁcients of the panel VAR based on panel OLS
without ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects and GMM. The results differ substantially,
which underline the importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects and the
resulting bias of the least squares estimator. Wald tests reported for
the GMM results show that the models have explanatory power. To
evaluate the quality of the instruments used for the GMM estimation,
Table 3 shows the autocorrelation tests for the ﬁrst and second lag,
the Sargan and the Hansen test. Valid instruments have to be exoge-
nous; hence, the second-order autocorrelation (Corr2) has to be negligi-
ble, which is the case, as the tests fail to reject the null hypothesis.3 The2 Detailed results including eigenvalues and unit-root tests are available from the au-
thors on request.
3 This test is robust in the presence of heteroskedasticity.Sargan and the Hansen tests focus on the overidentiﬁcation restrictions
and assess whether the set of instruments is appropriate. The issue is
that the Sargan test assumes homoskedastic errors,whereas the Hansen
test is robust. This explains why both tests differ. Accordingly, we use a
robust estimation of the variance covariance matrix. The Hansen tests
could not reject the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions
are valid.4 In line with Ozkan et al. (2004), Opler et al. (1999) and
Harford et al. (2008), the models conﬁrm a high correlation coefﬁcient
between current and past levels of cash holding of 0.61 (ﬁrst lag).More-
over, short-term debt exhibits a similar level of autocorrelation. Accord-
ingly, controlling for lagged variables is essential to obtain reliable
estimates. The OLS estimate of the panel VAR shows a high model ﬁt
with adjusted R-squared of 64% for short-term ﬁnance, 58% for cash
holding, 76% for the liquidity measure and 84% for trade credit.
Table 3 shows that some control variables have a statistically signif-
icant effect. Firms with high growth in the past year obtain less trade
credit, which shows that access to trade credit cannot be relied upon
to ﬁnance continuing growth. Interest coverage has a signiﬁcant but
very small effect on all time series except the CCC. Firms with high ﬁ-
nancial leverage exhibit signiﬁcantly less short-term bank ﬁnance and
more cash holding, which might be driven by banks denying access to
additional short-term lending, and ﬁrms holding cash as an alternative
funding source. Larger ﬁrms have better access to bank ﬁnance and
hold less cash, in line with prior research (except Harford et al., 2008).
There is also a size advantage related to the CCC, which might be due
to the stronger negotiating power of larger ﬁrms when dealing with
suppliers. Proﬁtability increases cash holding, which could be explained
by higher cash generation. Trade credit and the CCC increase with prof-
itability. The ﬁrst relationship can be interpreted as a supply-side effect,4 Apart from using the ﬁrst-differenced time series as suggested by Arellano and
Bond (1991), which are not always good instruments, we also tried a Helmert's
transformation — but the results did not differ (Arellano & Bover, 1995).
Table 4
Granger causality tests and cumulated impulse response functions.
The table shows Granger causality tests for different directions of inﬂuence indicated by arrows. Hence, the hypothesis cash→ S tests whether lagged short-term bank ﬁnance
(St− 1, St− 2, St− 3) inﬂuences current levels of cash holding. The test statistic (Chi-square) and the associated p-value are displayed. Columns four to six show the cumulated impulse response
functions for one,ﬁve and eight years.We used bootstrapping to determine conﬁdence intervals for cumulated impulse response functions. Stars (*, **, ***) indicate signiﬁcance on the 90%, 95%,
and 99% level of conﬁdence respectively. The last column indicates whether the impulse–response relationship can be interpreted as a supply or demand-side effect. If the cumulated impulse
response function is not signiﬁcant, we do not provide an interpretation.
Granger causality tests Cumulated impulse response function
Null hypotheses Chi-square p-value 1-year 5-years 8-years Interpretation
cash→ S 0.06 1.00 0.01 −0.01 0.02 –
liquid→ S 11.29 0.01 −0.04 0.10 0.12 –
tc→ S 8.29 0.04 0.17* 0.54* 0.64* Supply
S→ cash 1.88 0.60 −0.03 −0.05 −0.06 –
liquid→ cash 24.66 0.00 0.08* 0.24* 0.25* Demand
tc→ cash 27.53 0.00 0.10 0.43 0.48 –
S→ liquid 10.24 0.02 −0.02 −0.10 −0.11 –
cash→ liquid 36.17 0.00 0.09*** 0.33*** 0.34*** Agency/demand
tc→ liquid 23.36 0.00 0.18** 0.68*** 0.74*** Agency/demand
S→ tc 3.82 0.28 0.01 −0.07 −0.09
cash→ tc 55.43 0.00 0.04** 0.12* 0.14* Supply
liquid→ tc 57.76 0.00 0.06*** 0.20*** 0.22*** Demand
128 G. Kling et al. / International Review of Financial Analysis 32 (2014) 123–131as suppliers might be more willing to grant trade credit to a proﬁtable
ﬁrm. The second effect could indicate that ﬁrms with high proﬁtability
lack the need to improve working capital management. In contrast to
Bates et al. (2009), our measure of cash ﬂow risk has a negative impact
on cash holding, albeit the coefﬁcient is very small considering that the
variation coefﬁcient has to be between zero and one. Firms with high
cost of debt increase cash holding, which might be explained by a
substitution effect. These ﬁrms also exhibit a slower CCC.
4.3. Granger causality tests and impact multipliers
We test the causal relationships between cash holding, the CCC,
trade credit and short-termbank ﬁnance. Table 4 showsGranger causal-
ity tests based on theGMMestimates, which underline that the CCC and
trade credit inﬂuence short-term bank ﬁnance, whereas cash holding
does not have a causal effect. Cash holding in turn is driven by the CCC
and trade credit. All three endogenous variables affect liquidity, and
cash holding and the CCC affect trade credit. Granger causality tests re-
veal that the four variables are endogenous and interrelated; thus, using
the CCC as an explanatory variable to explain cash holding is misleadingTable 5
Mismatch of expectations: cash-rich versus average ﬁrm.
The annual means of actual cash holding (cash), short-term bank ﬁnance (S) and trade credit (t
determine the liquidity shortage (shortage) based on the actual liquidity needs determined by th
value indicates that additional short-term funding is required to maintain operations.∑Et sh
credit.
Cash-rich ﬁrms Average
Year cash ΣEt(cash) S ΣEt(S) tc ΣEt(tc) Shortage
1991 0.271 0.001 0.259 0.000 0.128 0.000 0.003
1992 0.290 0.003 0.251 0.000 0.119 0.000 0.010
1993 0.310 0.004 0.249 0.001 0.122 0.000 0.011
1994 0.301 0.005 0.225 0.001 0.122 0.000 0.012
1995 0.300 0.007 0.236 0.001 0.124 −0.001 0.018
1996 0.325 0.008 0.240 0.002 0.126 −0.001 0.016
1997 0.335 0.011 0.252 0.002 0.118 −0.001 0.013
1998 0.374 0.013 0.250 0.003 0.111 0.000 0.011
1999 0.364 0.014 0.230 0.000 0.106 −0.002 0.011
2000 0.407 0.016 0.178 0.000 0.084 −0.003 0.005
2001 0.428 0.017 0.178 0.001 0.081 −0.001 0.017
2002 0.410 0.028 0.196 0.005 0.089 −0.003 0.011
2003 0.408 0.036 0.221 0.004 0.107 −0.003 0.019
2004 0.435 0.041 0.202 0.007 0.096 −0.005 0.014
2005 0.441 0.045 0.173 0.007 0.084 −0.005 0.024
2006 0.436 0.060 0.158 0.006 0.075 −0.010 0.037
2007 0.422 0.085 0.167 0.006 0.078 −0.003 0.056
2008 0.400 0.086 0.195 0.025 0.087 −0.003 0.090(e.g. Deloof, 2001). To obtain a more precise estimate about the
underlying dynamics, we calculate impact multipliers based on the
GMM estimates and derive impulse response functions and cumulated
impulse response functions. Impulse response functions indicate the
response of one variable if another variable changes marginally.
We use this methodology to isolate signiﬁcant impulse–response
relationships, which we can interpret as demand or supply-side effects.
Using a bootstrapping approach that considers the panel data structure,
the original dataset is re-sampled 800 times and the estimated
coefﬁcients are obtained. The impact multipliers are calculated based
on the800point estimates. The percentiles of impact response functions
and cumulated impact response functions refer to the respective
bootstrapping distribution.
To illustrate the dynamics of the panel VAR, Table 4 summarises
cumulated impulse response functions for different periods after the
incremental shock. Only a few impulse responses are signiﬁcant and
have a relevant economic impact. The main beneﬁt of using impulse
response functions compared to analysing the coefﬁcients in Table 3
is that effects can be isolated. We interpret the impulse–response
relationships as either demand or supply-side driven. The supply-sidec) are shown for cash-rich ﬁrms that belong to the 75-percentile and the average ﬁrm.We
e networking capital and deduct the expected access to external ﬁnance. Hence, a positive
ows the cumulated forecasting error of cash holding, short-term bank ﬁnance and trade
ﬁrm
cash ΣEt(cash) S ΣEt(S) tc ΣEt(tc) Shortage
0.103 −0.001 0.250 0.001 0.137 0.000 0.023
0.113 −0.001 0.248 0.001 0.133 0.000 0.035
0.126 −0.003 0.238 0.001 0.136 0.001 0.048
0.128 −0.004 0.233 0.001 0.140 0.002 0.069
0.124 −0.006 0.239 0.002 0.142 0.004 0.083
0.130 −0.009 0.248 0.003 0.142 0.006 0.083
0.140 −0.009 0.253 0.004 0.140 0.007 0.083
0.146 −0.010 0.255 0.005 0.135 0.007 0.089
0.141 −0.011 0.237 0.003 0.128 0.007 0.093
0.160 −0.011 0.216 0.002 0.116 0.007 0.083
0.163 −0.012 0.219 0.002 0.110 0.006 0.117
0.163 −0.011 0.227 0.003 0.110 0.006 0.115
0.164 −0.009 0.239 0.004 0.117 0.007 0.119
0.182 −0.006 0.230 0.003 0.113 0.007 0.124
0.188 −0.004 0.217 0.002 0.107 0.006 0.143
0.186 −0.002 0.208 0.001 0.104 0.005 0.164
0.179 0.000 0.206 −0.001 0.100 0.003 0.156
0.164 0.000 0.213 0.000 0.101 0.000 0.166
Fig. 2.Difference in predicted cash ratios of surviving and non-surviving ﬁrms. The ﬁgure plots the difference in forecasted cash ratios of ﬁrms that survive during thewhole investigation
period compared to non-surviving ﬁrms. The result is shown in percentage points.
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demand-side argument highlights the ﬁrm's perspective and the de-
mand for liquidity.
Focusing on the supply-side effects of access to short-term bank ﬁ-
nance and trade credit, the model makes the following predictions:
(1) An increase in trade credit by 1% increases the level of short-term
bank ﬁnance by 0.64% (cumulative effect after eight years); hence, the
ﬁnding supports the complementary nature of trade credit and short-
term bank ﬁnance (Bias & Gollier, 1997; Burkart & Ellingsen, 2004).
From the perspective of banks, an increase in trade credit signals private
information of suppliers, which reduces the information asymmetry be-
tween the ﬁrm and the bank, which in turn improves access to bank ﬁ-
nance. (2) Cash holding has a positive impact on trade credit, which
shows that suppliers could consider cash as a positive signal concerning
the ﬁrm's ability to pay back the trade credit offered.
Isolating the demand-side effects that explain the need for cash
holding and other sources of short-term ﬁnance, the cumulated impulse
response functions illustrate the following relationships. (1) Firms fac-
ing a higher liquidity need due to a longer CCC increase cash holding.
(2) On a similar note, a slower CCC triggers more trade credit, which
we interpret as a demand-side effect, as ﬁrms with high liquidity
needs and ﬁnancial distress tend to rely more on trade credit, which is
relatively expensive. In addition, we observe two demand-side effects,
which could be interpreted in the context of agency theory. The cash
holding literature focuses on agency costs related to cash holding in
the context of long-term decisions such as mergers and acquisitions
(Harford, 1999; Graham &Harvey, 2001). Even in the short-term, agen-
cy costs could be relevant in the context of working capital manage-
ment, for managers that have additional cash or other sources of
funding might not be willing to make the effort to improve the CCC.
(3) The impulse response functions illustrate thatmore cash holding in-
creases the CCC, (4) and an increase in trade credit has an even stronger
effect. In contrast, additional short-term bank ﬁnance does not cause an
increase in the CCC, which can be explained by the monitoring role of
banks that deﬁne and control liquidity measures.5 We can show using a panel probit model that the risk of a liquidity shortage can be re-
duced through cash holding (p-value 0.017). In addition, ﬁrm size mitigates the risk (p-
value 0.000) as does proﬁtability (p-value 0.040)— but a high ﬁnancial leverage increases
the likelihood of a shortage (p-value 0.008).4.4. Out-of sample forecasts and cash-rich ﬁrms
Based on the panel VAR, we forecast the level of cash holding
and compare ﬁtted values to actual cash holding over time to detect
any inconsistencies due to parameter instability or other time related
unobserved variables. The parameters seem to be stable, and themodel ﬁt does not depend on the time period selected. To checkwheth-
er the predictions are reliable, we determine one-step-ahead forecasts.
Table 5 shows cumulated forecasting errors, which indicate whether
the model over- or understates the respective dependent variable. The
cumulated forecasting error in 2008, which refers to the whole
period from 1991 to 2008, reveals that themodel forecasts cash holding
(∑Et(cash)), short-term bank ﬁnance (∑Et(S)) and trade credit
(∑Et(tc)) with great precision.
However, isolating ﬁrms with high cash holding deﬁned as above
the 75-percentile in 1988 uncovers that the model understates the
stockpiling of cash by cash-rich ﬁrms. These ﬁrms increased cash ratios
from 27.1% to 40.0%. Accordingly, the observed increase was 12.9 per-
centage points; however, the model made a cumulative forecasting
error of +8.6 percentage points (shown in year 2008 in Table 5). This
means that the model predicted that cash holding of cash-rich ﬁrms
would increase by 4.3 percentage points (i.e. 12.9–8.6), which under-
states the actual accumulation of cash. The observed increase in average
cash holding as shown in Fig. 1 is mainly due to the rapid accumulation
of cash by ﬁrms belonging to the 75-percentile in 1988.
Comparing cash-rich ﬁrms to the average ﬁrm reveals that there is a
substantialmismatchbetween expected and actual access to short-term
bank ﬁnance. Table 5 reveals this mismatch in column∑Et(S) and
shows in row2008 that expected access to bank-ﬁnance exceeds the ac-
tual access by 2.5 percentage points in the case of cash-rich ﬁrms. Ac-
cordingly, the increase in cash holding compensates for the lack of
access to short-term bank ﬁnance. In contrast, trade credit was in line
with expectations indicated by∑Et(tc) in row 2008 reaching only
−0.3 percentage points. Cash-rich ﬁrms could reduce the risk of a li-
quidity shortage, deﬁned as actual liquidity in excess of expected access
to external ﬁnance, through cash holding. The likelihood of a shortfall
has increased sharply since the start of the recent ﬁnancial crisis with
cash-rich ﬁrms exhibiting a substantially reduced risk compared to
the sample average. From a modelling perspective, the panel VAR does
not impose any theoretical restrictions, which is both the beneﬁt and
weakness of VAR models. On average the panel VAR predicts the in-
crease in cash holding correctly. But some ﬁrms face an unexpected
shortage of external funding and need to mitigate the risk of liquidity
shortages by holding more cash.5
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5.1. Survivorship bias
Any panel data studymight suffer from a survivorship bias, for some
companies are delisted during the investigation period. Mergers and ac-
quisitions are the most likely cause of a delisting. It is possible that the
changing number of cross-sectional units has an impact on the empiri-
cal outcome; therefore, we distinguish between ﬁrms that are listed
during the whole investigation period and those that are listed later or
delisted. The panel VAR (Eq. (2)) is re-estimated for the two subgroups
of ﬁrms, and the results do not differ qualitatively. An alternative meth-
od is to include the number of years listed as an additional variable of
the panel VAR and analyse whether ﬁrms with a longer listing history
exhibit different levels of the four endogenous variables. The number
of years listed does not inﬂuence cash holding nor liquidity needs,
whereas trade credit and short-term bank ﬁnance are signiﬁcantly
affected, albeit the magnitude of inﬂuence is very low with coefﬁcients
of 0.0002 and 0.0008 respectively. The alleged survivorship bias does
not alter our ﬁndings, and the listing period has only a minor effect on
trade credit and short-term bank ﬁnance. This suggests that the period
of listings has a negligible impact on cash holding in contrast to Bates
et al. (2009). To illustrate the potential survivorship bias, Fig. 2 plots
predicted cash ratios for surviving and non-surviving ﬁrms. As expect-
ed, non-surviving ﬁrms exhibit on average lower cash-ratios compared
to surviving ﬁrms; however, the difference amounts to 0.7 percentage
points from 1991 to 2008, which is negligible. Moreover, the difference
seems to be stable over time; thus, an alleged survivorship bias cannot
explain the increase in cash holding.
5.2. Cash holding to cover expected operating losses
Motivated by Opler et al. (1999), who contend that operating losses
reduce cash holding, one could argue that ﬁrms hold cash to cover fu-
ture operating losses. Applying a panel probit model that explains
whether a ﬁrm experiences an operating loss or not, we predict the
probability of operating losses. The expected probability is then includ-
ed into thepanel VARas a predetermined variable. Note that the expect-
ed probability in t is based on information available in t− 1; hence, the
variable is weakly exogenous. There is a sharp increase in the expected
probability of operating losses from 5.6% in 1990 to 18.2% in 2008;
however, the partial impact on cash holding is limited with a coefﬁcient
of 0.046 (p-value of 0.017). Accordingly, even if the predicted probabil-
ity reaches one, the expected level of cash holding increases only by
0.046 percentage points, which does not explain the substantial
increase in cash holding since 2001.6
6. Conclusion
This paper focuses on cash holding and its closest substitutes, short-
term bank ﬁnance and trade credit. We determine the ﬁrm's need for li-
quidity based on the CCC. A panel VAR approach extends prior empirical
models and reveals the dynamic relationship between cash and other
short-term sources of funding. Granger causality tests show that all
four variables are endogenous and hence single-equation models used
in the literature might suffer from an endogeneity bias (e.g. Deloof,
2001). Moreover, impulse response functions can isolate the dynamic
impact of an incremental change of one endogenous variable on anoth-
er. We interpret different impulse–response relations as demand or
supply-side driven. Trade credit increases short-term bank ﬁnance,
which we regard as a supply-side effect based on the signalling theory
of trade credit (Bias & Gollier, 1997; Burkart & Ellingsen, 2004).6 Detailed results are available from the authors on request.Additional cash holding triggers an increase in trade credit, which can
be viewed as a supply-side effect, as suppliers might be more willing
to provide trade credit to ﬁrms with higher cash holding. There are
two demand-side effects. A short-term liquidity shock causes more
cash holding and trade credit; thus, ﬁrms do not prefer bank ﬁnance
in case of unexpected liquidity needs. We also argue that there are
two demand-side effects that could be explained by agency theory.
The availability of additional cash or trade credit causes a slowdown of
the CCC. Therefore, one could argue that ﬁrms that have sufﬁcient
funding do not improve their CCC in spite of the fact that a faster CCC
would create more shareholder value. Improving working capital
management takes effort and might alienate customers. Additional
short-term bank ﬁnance does not have any impact on the CCC, which
we explain by the monitoring role of banks and predeﬁned levels of
liquidity measures.
The panel VAR can forecast the four endogenous variables accurate-
ly; however, the in-sample heterogeneity shows that ﬁrms belonging to
the 75-percentile in terms of cash holding experience an unexpected
decline in short-term bank ﬁnance. Firms faced with an unexpected
shortage of external funding react by increasing cash holding. The
panel VAR and the unexpected decline in short-term bank ﬁnance can
explain to a large extent the recent increase in cash holding. The robust-
ness checks address a potential survivorship bias and evaluate the
impact of operating losses on cash holding.
Our study shows that short-term bank ﬁnance improves the liquid-
ity of ﬁrmswithout causing a deterioration ofworking capital discipline.
We observe a pronounced decline in short-term bank ﬁnance in the UK,
which contributes to the accumulation of cash. From a policy perspec-
tive, improving access to short-term bank ﬁnance is beneﬁcial, as the
substitutes, cash holding and trade credit, cause agency costs due to
an increase in the CCC.
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